In his 2002 “Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience,” Michael Tye argues against so-called qualia realism in favor of the transparency thesis, according to which the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly exhausted by the external qualities it represents. For obvious reasons, the transparency thesis comports well with Tye’s preferred externalist representationalism—but the fit is not flawless, as acknowledged by Tye in 2010’s “The Puzzle of Transparency.” Herein, I will explore the “really tough question” raised in the latter article and suggest that the answer must lie in veridical indexicality, a proposed property of conscious entities that makes true their de se attitudes regarding phenomenology. In brief, veridical indexicality can be understood as the “genuine for-me-ness” of an experience. My contention is that the transparency thesis fails to render an exhaustive account of phenomenology—resulting in the “puzzle” Tye mentions—precisely because it ignores this crucial, ever-present, and perhaps even introspectively detectable component of our experience.