Given the sort of introspective access that we take a person to have to her own experience, it seems incoherent that she could reach a false conclusion regarding whether she is occurently tokening a type of phenomenology. Yet, this is exactly what seems to be the case in the dispute over the existence of a phenomenology proprietary to cognition (CP), with proponents claiming that introspection yields clear evidence of CP, and opponents denying that introspection turns up any such thing. One of these parties must be wrong about their own phenomenology. It might be thought that the burden of proof should fall on those making the positive proposal, where the implicit assumption behind this diagnosis is that it is easier to reach false positives with respect to the number of tokens, and even number of types, of phenomenology one is experiencing, than it is to reach false negatives. Against this thesis, I offer two thought experiments which demonstrate the plausibility of phenomenological false negatives. Where false negatives are no less likely than false positives, I conclude that comparisons of introspective data result in a draw between proponents and opponents of CP, such that the deciding factors in the debate must be drawn from elsewhere. Furthermore however, I conclude that disagreement over the results of introspection need not be seen to show that the CP debate is merely terminological.